PERMANENT AWARD EVIDENCE

999 Risk Assessment

DSIT · published 22 Sept 2026. This page preserves the identifiers and current held fields for one Contracts Finder release; it is not an invoice, performance assessment or complete contract history.

Contracts Finder release ID0d8130e5-af61-45d5-bb0f-1e3a86615274-914903
Open Contracting ID (OCID)ocds-b5fd17-40a43d60-17dc-479a-93fe-258e9efea7d0
Buyer identifierGB-CFS-332492
Release typeaward
PUBLISHED COMMERCIAL FIELDS

Values stay separate.

A tender estimate and an award value answer different questions. Neither is treated as cash paid.

Award value
£199,020
award field
Tender value
£199,020
tender field
Procurement method
Call-off from a dynamic purchasing system
Category
services
CPV
73000000
Research and development services and related consultancy services
Delivery
British Oversea Territories
No postcode
PUBLISHED DESCRIPTION

What the notice says

The Department for Science, Innovation & Technology (DSIT) is seeking to commission an independent Network and Cyber Risk Assessment of the UK Public Emergency Call Service (PECS), accessed via 999 and 112. PECS is the public's primary route to emergency help and is a critical national service relied on by the public, emergency services, Government and industry. Around 37 million 999/112 calls were made in 2025. This procurement is funded through the Integrated Security Fund (ISF) and is being led by DSIT's Telecoms Security and Resilience team within the Digital Infrastructure Directorate. DSIT leads UK Government policy on the resilience of the 999 service and provides the secretariat for the 999/112 Liaison Committee. The Committee brings together lead Government departments, Ofcom, emergency services, BT as the call handling agent, Communication Providers, devolved administrations and other relevant organisations. It provides a forum for technical and operational oversight of PECS, supports escalation of issues across the system, and maintains the PECS Code of Practice. On 25 June 2023, BT experienced a major technical failure affecting its role as the Centralised Handling Authority (CHA) for 999 calls in the UK. The fault lasted for over ten hours and resulted in almost 10,000 unique callers being unable to reach 999 or 112. This was the first significant disruption to the service in nearly 90 years. The outage prompted significant public concern and formal review activity, including Ofcom's review and Government's post-incident review. Those reviews highlighted weaknesses in cross-system visibility, response arrangements and the absence of a single set of comprehensive procedures or risk information across the end-to-end call chain. The 999/112 call chain is a multi-organisation system involving several interdependent parties: - Communication Providers (CPs) - who originate and route 999 calls from fixed-line, mobile, and VoIP networks; - BT as the Centralised Handling Authority (CHA) - which receives, triages and routes calls to the appropriate emergency authority; - Emergency Authorities (EAs) and their control rooms - including Police, Fire, Ambulance and Coastguard - which receive and handle the calls. In broad terms, a caller dials 999 or 112; the originating Communication Provider transfers the call to BT's CHA switch sites; BT's 999 call handling operation identifies the appropriate Emergency Authority and routes the call onward; and the receiving Emergency Authority control room determines and coordinates the emergency response. Risks can arise at any point in this chain, but are particularly likely to emerge at the interfaces between organisations, systems and contractual responsibilities. Section 2 Specification of Requirements OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Each segment relies on complex telecommunications infrastructure, a mix of legacy TDM/PSTN and next-generation IP/cloud technologies, and mu

Tender statuscomplete
STAGE-DATE LEDGER

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The current projection contains one award release, not a verified chain of planning, tender, award, contract and modification records. Dates are shown in source-field order and are not silently repaired.

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  1. 01Notice publishedPublication timestamp on the held release22 Sept 2026
  2. 02Tender period startsTender-period field as published2 Sept 2026
  3. 03Tender period endsTender-period field as published31 Jul 2026End precedes start · verify
  4. 04Contract startsContract-period field as published2 Sept 2026
  5. 05Contract endsContract-period field as published31 Mar 2028
SUPPLIER EVIDENCE

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Published name only

ACTICA CONSULTING

No legal entity is inferred from this supplier name.

SOURCE

Contracts Finder release

Published 22 Sept 2026 · held through the daily award projection · Open Government Licence v3.0.

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